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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In this paper we propose two new criteria to evaluate the appropriateness of a 
country joining a larger currency area. The first of these, asymmetric-shocks-on- 
its-head, argues that far from being an argument for sticking to monetary 
autonomy, asymmetric shocks to real GDP provide an argument for adopting a 
common currency. The argument comes in three steps. 
 
First, independent monetary policy and a floating nominal exchange rate are not 
effective instruments for mitigating the consequences of asymmetric shocks. In 
practice, monetary independence may well amplify country-specific shocks 
rather than dampen them. Second, standard portfolio diversification arguments 
support the view that the more asymmetric (the more uncorrelated or negatively 
correlated) GDP shocks are, the greater the benefits from international portfolio 
diversification (broadly defined). Third, financial portfolio diversification is 
greatly encouraged by having a common currency: home bias diminishes 
significantly when two countries share a currency. 
 
The lender of last resort theory of optimal currency areas starts from the 
observation that there is no such thing as a safe bank. Even a solvent bank can be 
brought down by a depositor run or market run. The central bank has to be able 
to act as lender of last resort and market maker of last resort so ensure the 
survival of even solvent banks. When much of the balance sheet of the central 
bank (or of the balance sheet  of  its  domestic  customers)  is  denominated  in 
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 foreign currency, and specifically when there is either a large net foreign 
currency exposure or a large net short-term liability exposure in foreign 
exchange, the survival of banks faced with funding liquidity or market liquidity 
problems requires either a foreign currency lender of last resort or a domestic 
currency that is also a global reserve currency. There are but two serious global 
reserve currencies today: the US dollar and the euro. 
 
Iceland is a classic example of what can happen to a country with a banking 
sector that is large relative to the rest of the economy and that has short-term 
foreign exchange funding needs that outstrip the resources of its central bank. In 
Poland, the banks may have limited foreign currency exposure, but its domestic 
customers do not. In particular, the household sector has borrowed 
overwhelmingly in foreign currency, including Swiss franc, euro and yen. The 
Polish banking system has therefore swapped its foreign exchange risk for credit 
risk through the unhedged foreign exchange risk assumed by its domestic non- 
bank private sector. The fact that Hungary is in worse shape than Poland, both as 
regards its net foreign currency exposure and as regards the currency mismatch in 
the non-bank private sector is not really a source of much comfort. 
 
We doubt whether the National Bank of Poland has the resources to refinance the 
foreign currency exposure of the domestic private sector. Both refinancing risk 
(liquidity risk) and solvency risk due to a large depreciation of the zloty can 
therefore be avoided only by Poland adopting the euro and gaining access to the 
lender of last resort and market maker of last resort facilities of the Eurosystem. 
 
 
 
I. THE ASYMMETRIC-SHOCKS-ON-ITS-HEAD THEORY OF 
OCAS 
 
 
The conventional view that asymmetric shocks to the demand for or the supply of 
domestic output make a common currency undesirable is based on the view that 
national monetary policy can be used effectively to dampen undesirable 
fluctuations in the output gap. The economic theory underlying it is Keynesian, 
Old- or New-, because the ability of monetary policy to influence the real 
economy depends on the existence of nominal price or cost rigidities. 
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 In the presence of a high degree of international capital mobility, the theory must 
be ‗augmented‘ to allow for the distinction between ‗IS‘ shocks and ‗LM‘ 
shocks. In the limiting case of perfect international capital mobility, keeping the 
domestic nominal interest rate constant is the optimal output and price level 
stabilising response to a money demand (‗LM‘) shock. One way to achieve this is 
to have a credible fixed exchange rate regime. The most credible fixed exchange 
rate regime is a common currency. 
 
Even within a Keynesian setting, and even if the shocks perturbing the output gap 
are demand shocks (at a given domestic interest rate, a given exchange rate, a 
given price level and given expectations of future prices and exchange rates), the 
desirability of discretionary national monetary policy is questionable. It assumes 
(1) that the monetary policy authority is benevolent, (2) that the monetary policy 
authority is competent and (3), that asset markets, including the foreign exchange 
markets, are efficient. 
 
All three assumptions are questionable. The authorities could be malevolent or 
benevolent but opportunistic (incapable of credible commitment). They could be 
incompetent or the structure of the economy could be sufficiently complex and 
opaque as to make destabilising policy as likely as stabilising monetary policy. 
Monetary policy lags are long, variable and uncertain. Policy does not just have 
to contend with the outside lag (from the instrument to the economy) but also 
with the inside lag (the lag between the arrival of new policy-relevant 
information and the right decision being made and implemented). In addition, 
financial markets are far from efficient, even in the textbook sense of efficiency 
and certainly in the broader sense of setting prices conducive to socially efficient 
outcomes. Herding behaviour, panic, fear, exhilaration, mania, confidence and 
trust all powerfully influence asset prices and do so in unpredictable ways and in 
ways that cannot be easily harnessed to the pursuit of macroeconomic stability. 
 
So instead of acting as a buffer or as a shock-absorber, damping exogenous 
shocks and reducing the real resource cost of achieving a given necessary 
adjustment in the real exchange rate, changes in the nominal exchange rate may 
contribute to the amplification of shocks, to excess volatility and to possibly 
quite persistent misalignments of the real exchange rate. 
 
If the economy were Keynesian but simply too complex to stabilise effectively 
through the use of domestic monetary policy, the exchange rate regime would be 
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 a matter of indifference from the point of view of stabilising real GDP. If, 
however, stabilising consumption rather than GDP is the purpose of policy, then 
even if GDP fluctuations either are exogenous or not amenable to systematic 
stabilisation through monetary policy, other more classical consumption 
stabilisation instruments may be available. 
 
 
 
II.  THE DESIRABILITY OF ECONOMIC DIVERGENCE 
 
 
Whether real convergence (defined as convergence of per capita GDP levels 
among EU nations) is good or bad depends crucially on the scope for cross- 
border redistribution and risk sharing. It is key to distinguish between first 
moment convergence and second moment convergence. First moment 
convergence concerns the convergence of expected levels or growth rates of real 
per capita GDP. Second moment convergence refers to the degree to which 
national deviations from the mean level or growth rate of real per capita GDP are 
positively or negatively correlated, that is, it refers to the conditional covariances 
between national real per capita GDP levels or growth rates. 
 
It is likely that first-moment divergence, which implies increasing inequality 
between national per capita GDP levels, even though it does not necessarily 
indicate inefficient use of resources in any nation, is likely to create increasing 
political tensions, unless there are effective mechanisms for redistributing income 
between nations to ensure that divergence per capita output levels need not imply 
divergent per capita consumption and economic wellbeing. 
 
Uncoupling of national consumption from national GDP can be done through a 
number of private, market-based mechanisms, through private non-market 
mechanisms and through cross-border fiscal transfers. Private market-based 
mechanisms include international financial portfolio diversification (especially 
ownership by residents of one nation of equity stakes in companies operating in 
other member countries) and international labour mobility. Private non-market- 
based mechanisms include cross-border private transfers, such as remittances and 
charitable donations. 
 
International transfers can either be made by national governments or by a 
supranational European entity. In practice, in the EU, the redistributional role of 
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 the supranational bodies is negligible: the total budget of the EU institutions is 
less than 1.25% of EU GDP, and about a third of that goes towards 
administrative costs. With the exception of the European Investment Bank, the 
EU institutions have to balance their budgets on a year-by-year basis. Clearly an 
average contribution of just over one percent of EU GDP can finance a 
significantly larger EU transfer (as a share of recipient GDP) to poorer countries. 
Even so, the redistributional role of the Commission is limited indeed. Bilateral 
or multilateral intergovernmental transfers in the EU are not part of the political- 
economic landscape. 
 
The same private and public mechanisms that provide redistribution can also 
provide insurance, that is, they can act as risk sharing mechanisms. Indeed, the 
difference between redistribution and risk sharing is very similar to the first 
moment vs second moment distinction we made for convergence. Redistribution 
concerns income or wealth-contingent transfers in the absence of uncertainty. 
Risk-sharing involves payments (or other actions-in-kind) contingent on the 
realisation of some unknown future random variable. 
 
First-moment divergence is at best neutral. This will be the outcome when (a) the 
divergence in real economic performance (productivity, efficiency) is not due to 
preventable or corrigible market failure or government failure, and (b) is made 
congruent with the Union‘s distributional/fairness objectives through effective 
and efficient redistribution. If either (a) or (b) fail to be satisfied, first-moment 
divergence is a problem – in all likelihood both an economic efficiency problem 
and a political fairness/distributional problem. 
 
If first-moment divergence is a problem in the EU and the EMU, and even if the 
divergence has been exacerbated by integrationist measures like the Single 
European Act (SEA) in 1986 or by the adoption of a common currency by 11 EU 
members in 1999, the policy implications are by no means obvious. Reversing 
the painfully achieved, albeit still very limited, deep integration pursued by the 
Single Market Programme (SMP) launched in 1992, would result in massive 
efficiency losses and would probably mean the end of the EU. Leaving EMU 
would make absolutely no economic sense for any of the 15 present members. 
 
Unlike first moment divergence, second moment divergence can, provided 
sufficient cross-border risk sharing is possible, be a highly desirable 
phenomenon.   In what follows, second moment divergence will be associated 
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 with asymmetric shocks, that is, negatively correlated shocks to the levels or 
growth rates of real national GDP. This follows from a straightforward 
application of portfolio theory under uncertainty. 
 
For simplicity, view the monetary union as a closed system and ignore real 
capital formation. In the aggregate, therefore, the citizens of the Union consume 
the aggregate GDP of the Union. Under financial autarky and without labour 
mobility, each nation‘s residents own the assets that produce that nation‘s GDP. 
Since the abolition of slavery, human wealth (the present discounted value of the 
future earnings of a worker) cannot be traded either within or across national 
borders. Without international financial portfolio diversification, claims to the 
earnings of the domestic capital stock also cannot be traded across borders. 
Without labour mobility, and without cross-border fiscal transfers, it follows that 
each nation‘s consumers have to consume that nation‘s GDP. The variance of 
their national consumption is the variance of domestic GDP. 
 
When national equity markets become integrated into a single Union-wide equity 
market, risk sharing through risk trading, that is, through financial portfolio 
diversification becomes an option for capital income. Most of national GDP is, of 
course, national labour income, which is not perfectly correlated with national 
capital income and is unlikely to be spanned by the capital income claims of the 
entire union. Sharing labour income risk will therefore have to occur either 
through cross-border fiscal mechanisms or through labour mobility. If these risk- 
sharing mechanisms are sufficiently developed, asymmetric shocks or second- 
moment divergence, becomes a boon rather than a bane. 
 
Consider the extreme case where there is either a complete set of risk-trading 
markets or a complete set of national-GDP contingent cross-border transfer 
payments. It is clear that, in this world, holding constant the variances of national 
GDP levels, a higher negative correlation between the national GDP levels means 
that Union-wide aggregate GDP will be more stable, and so will Union-wide 
aggregate consumption. With complete risk sharing, individual national 
consumption levels can perfectly match the behaviour of the aggregate Union- 
wide consumption. 
 
Second-moment divergence is therefore welfare-enhancing when there are 
sufficient opportunities for cross-border risk sharing. The job of the Commission 
is to strive to encourage the creation of private and public (intergovernmental 
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 and/or supranational) mechanisms for risk sharing. Both the SMP and the EMU 
are important mechanisms for boosting the scope for international portfolio 
diversification and cross-border labour mobility. 
 
There may also be a role for policy in ensuring that national GDP moments are 
not larger than is efficient in the light of the inherent uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the economic environment (tastes, technology, information, 
acts of nature, acts of God etc). Whatever may be achievable as regards reducing 
the variances of national GDP levels, however, households in the EMU should 
hope for asymmetric rather than symmetric shocks. 
 
As regards first moment divergence, the first-best strategy is to encourage 
optimal economic performance, including growth, in each nation state, and to 
agree on a set of socially acceptable cross-border redistribution policies if the 
efficient performance levels are too divergent to be politically acceptable. There 
is no reason to believe, in view of the vast structural differences between the 
members of the Union, that efficient levels and growth rates of real per capita 
GDP would be similar, let along convergent among Union members. Given the 
extremely limited set of public and private instruments for cross-border 
redistribution in the E(M)U, it is unlikely that much can be expected  from 
policies to mitigate first moment divergence. 
 
 
 
III. EMU AND CROSS-BORDER PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION 
 
 
We pointed to four mechanisms for cross-border risk sharing. First, the public 
sector can provide cross-border risk-sharing through contingent cross-border 
fiscal transfers. Second, the private sector can provide cross-border risk-sharing 
through cross-border private transfers. Cross-border remittances are an example, 
as are private cross-border charitable transfers. Third, the private sector can trade 
risk across national boundaries through international financial portfolio 
diversification. Such markets are well-established at for ownership claims to 
capital income. Fourth, it is in principle possible, without trading directly in 
claims on current and future primary labour income (which would be illegal since 
the abolition of slavery and indentured labour), for the private sector to create 
financial instruments promising a future payment stream benchmarked against 
observable and verifiable labour income developments at home and abroad. 
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 Individual labour income is private information and is, within limits, a choice 
variable of the owner, the individual worker. There are obvious moral hazard and 
adverse selection arguments that will restrict the market for labour income- 
contingent securities whose payoffs depend on the income of a single worker or a 
small number of workers. No such arguments apply against the issuance of 
labour income-contingent financial claims based on the labour income earned in 
an entire national economy or even in a significant sector, sub-sector or industry 
within a national economy. The creation of such social risk-trading instruments 
(GDP-contingent claims, aggregate labour income-contingent claims etc.) has 
indeed been proposed by such distinguished financial economists as Robert 
Shiller (1993, 2003). Real-world examples of such instruments are no longer 
uncommon. A well-known example are Argentina‘s GDP growth contingent 
claims, issued following the default of 2003, which offer a payoff to investors 
only if Argentine real annual GDP growth exceeds three percent per annum. 
 
The fifth mechanism for sharing risk across national boundaries is migration, 
specifically labour mobility. When workers move across borders, typically from 
low wage to high-wage countries, individual labour income risk can be mitigated, 
even if measures of national labour income for the source country are not 
necessarily favourably affected. Migration is of course intimately tied up with 
remittances to relatives left behind. 
 
Monetary union strongly affects a nation‘s capacity to use the third (cross-border 
financial portfolio diversification) and the fourth (cross-border trade in Shiller 
securities) of these mechanisms for cross-border sharing of consumption risk. 
 
The great contribution of the EU to the depth and breadth of cross-border risk- 
sharing and risk trading cannot be denied. The abolition of effectively all 
administrative and fiscal obstacles to international financial capital mobility is a 
core part of the Acquis. The Single European Act has permitted and continues to 
encourage unprecedented cross-border integration for all 27 EU members of 
financial markets and markets for financial services and products. The result has 
been a marked decrease in the home bias of the portfolios held by private 
investors in the EU and a huge increase in gross cross-holdings of securities 
across national boundaries. 
 
For the EMU members, the common currency has been a further important 
stimulus to financial market integration and development. European corporate 
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 bond markets for euro-denominated debt are now larger than their US 
counterparts. While the exact nature of the cost savings and market-deepening 
effects of a common currency are hard to quantify, there can be little doubt that 
the creation of the common currency has dealt a further blow to home bias in 
portfolio allocation. 
 
Thus, a common currency permits improved cross-border consumption risk 
sharing through portfolio diversification. This will be more valuable, the greater 
the degree of second-moment real divergence among the countries of the EMU. 
 
 
 
 IV. THE LENDER-OF-LAST-RESORT THEORY OF OPTIMAL 
CURRENCY AREAS 
 
 
 
 
 IV.  THE LENDER-OF-LAST-RESORT THEORY OF OCAS 
 
 
There is no such thing as a safe bank, even if its assets are sound, in the sense 
that they would cover all obligations if held to maturity. Any highly leveraged 
entity that borrows short and lends long and illiquid is vulnerable to a speculative 
attack (run). A withdrawal of deposits, refusal to renew credit or inability to sell 
assets could force a bank into insolvency even if its assets were good, provided 
they could be held to maturity. 
 
A viable banking system therefore requires a central bank that can act as lender 
of last resort (to offer support against funding illiquidity) and market maker of 
last resort (to offer support against market illiquidity of its assets). 
 
A viable lender of last resort and market maker of last resort has to be able to 
provide ample liquidity in the currency to which the banks it wants to support are 
exposed. If the bulk of the banks' short-term liabilities are domestic-currency- 
denominated, the central bank can always act as lender of last resort (LLR) and 
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 market maker of last resort (MMLR), although the price of doing so may be 
excessive inflation. 
 
Excessive inflation will result from central bank domestic-currency LLR and 
MMLR operations, if the banks have a fundamental solvency problem (a 
solvency gap even if the assets could be held to maturity) rather than just a 
liquidity problem. In that case, the LLR and MMLR task can be fulfilled without 
excessive inflation only if the fiscal authorities can recapitalise the banks. 
 
When a large part of the short-maturity liabilities of the banking system or its 
customers are denominated in foreign currency, and if these short-term, liquid 
foreign currency liabilities are not hedged by liquid foreign currency assets, as 
was the case in Iceland, for instance, the central bank can act as foreign currency 
LLR and MMLR only to the limit of its foreign exchange reserves and its ability 
to borrow foreign exchange, through swaps with other central banks, credit lines 
or whatever. 
 
The ability of the central bank to borrow foreign exchange is ultimately limited 
by the ability of the sovereign to borrow foreign exchange. That in turn is limited 
by the ability of the sovereign to make (1) an internal fiscal transfer (now and in 
the future) from domestic households and firms to the state and (2) an external 
transfer of resources (now and in the future) to its foreign creditors. 
 
The internal transfer requires higher taxes or lower public spending.  The 
external transfer requires primary external surpluses (surpluses in the current 
account excluding net foreign investment income). That in turn requires a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate and probably a worsening of the external 
terms of trade. 
 
Both the internal transfer and the external transfer are painful and politically 
unpopular. The question then becomes whether it was credible that the 
government would be able and willing to put the domestic economy through the 
wringer required to guarantee the servicing of the external debt. 
 
There is a range of alternative ways of collateralising external borrowing by the 
authorities, that might not involve large-scale unemployment and excess 
capacity. Securitizing future revenues from natural resource endowments that 
have not yet been exploited can be an attractive option. 
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 How would membership of a wider currency union, especially of a currency 
union whose currency is a global reserve currency, make a difference? It would 
not make any difference if the problem of the banks had been one of fundamental 
insolvency - if the hold-to-maturity value of the assets was insufficient to cover 
its obligations. But if the problem were only one of illiquidity causing a non- 
fundamental insolvency because the assets of the banks could be realised in the 
short run only at fire-sale prices, then membership of the eurozone would have 
permitted the banks to survive. Many of the illiquid assets of the banks could 
have been used as collateral at the discount window of the Eurosystem or in 
Eurosystem repos. Because the euro is a global reserve currency, there would 
have been no appreciable effect on the external value of the euro from the LLR 
and MMLR operations of the Eurosystem in support of the banks of any not too 
large member country. 
 
None of this would do any good if the banks' problem had been one of 
fundamental insolvency rather than illiquidity creating the risk of non- 
fundamental insolvency. Even in the euro area, any country with a large banking 
system could face an unmanageable banking sector insolvency gap. The 
fundamental solvency gap of the banks could be too large to be manageable for 
the national fiscal authority. Only international aid, or fiscal risk insurance and 
fiscal burden sharing would help a country whose banking system's solvency gap 
exceeded the fiscal capacity of the national authorities. But if the country‘s banks 
are fundamentally sound, then membership of the euro area would have 
prevented a collapse. 
 
This financial stability of lender of last resort theory of optimal currency areas 
has obvious lessons here for other small and medium-sized countries with large, 
internationally exposed banking sectors and their own currencies. In Eastern 
Europe, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. 
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